- Introduction: The Concept and Purpose of Bail
In criminal law, bail refers to the temporary release of a person who has been arrested or charged with a criminal offence, on the condition that the person will return to the police or court whenever required. In simple terms, bail is a legal promise by an accused person to appear before the authorities, sometimes backed by money or by other persons who guarantee that promise.
When bail is granted, the accused person usually enters into a bond (also called a recognisance). A bond is a formal written promise to appear before the court or the police. In some cases, the bond is supported by sureties. Sureties are persons who guarantee that the accused will appear as required and who may be liable to pay money if the accused absconds. Bail may therefore be granted with sureties, without sureties, or on self-recognisance, where the accused alone gives the undertaking.
The concept of bail is grounded primarily in the constitutional presumption of innocence under Article 19(2)(c) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, which provides that every person charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty. Bail therefore serves as a mechanism to prevent unnecessary detention whilst ensuring that the accused remains available for justice to take its course. This rationale extends, in appropriate cases, even to persons who have been convicted but whose guilt is not yet conclusive, such as where an appeal is pending.
As Taylor J (as he then was) affirmed in Okoe v The Republic [1976] 1 GLR 80, adopting the classical statement of Coleridge J in R v Scaife (1841) 5 JP 406, bail ‘is not a question as to the guilt or innocence of the person’ but a mechanism ‘to ensure the certainty of [the accused’s] appearing to take their trial.’ His Lordship further endorsed the principle, first stated by Lord Russell of Killowen CJ in R v Rose [1895–1899] All ER Rep 350 and affirmed through section 96(4) of Act 30, that bail ‘is not to be withheld as a punishment,’ but as a procedural tool to balance personal liberty with the interests of justice.
Under Ghanaian law, the grant or refusal of bail by a court is discretionary and is guided by several statutory and judicially recognised factors. This article focuses on two of such factors, namely: the likelihood that the accused may interfere with investigations or witnesses, and the likelihood that the accused may commit further offences whilst on bail. These are the two factors I find worth commenting on in this article, given some observations I have made in our courts.
- Types and Stages of Bail Under Ghanaian Law
Before delving into the factors used by the courts, it is helpful to briefly consider the main types and stages of bail under Ghanaian law, as the principles governing bail operate across these stages, subject to some nuances.
(a) Police Enquiry Bail is granted by the police to a suspect during investigations, usually before the person is formally charged and brought before a court. Its purpose is to allow investigations to continue without unnecessarily detaining the suspect.
(b) Pre-Trial Bail is granted by a court to an accused person who has been charged but not yet convicted. Its primary purpose is to secure the accused’s attendance at trial and to safeguard constitutional rights, including the right to be tried within a reasonable time.
(c) Bail Pending Appeal is granted after conviction whilst an appeal is pending. Although the accused has been found guilty at first instance, bail may be granted to prevent the hardship of serving a sentence that may ultimately be overturned on appeal.
- Statutory Factors Under Section 96 of Act 30
Section 96(5) of the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30) provides that a court shall refuse to grant bail if it is satisfied that the defendant:
(a) may not appear to stand trial;
(b) may interfere with any witness or evidence, or in any way hamper police investigations;
(c) may commit a further offence when on bail; or
(d) is charged with an offence punishable by imprisonment exceeding six months which is alleged to have been committed whilst on bail.
Of these, the two factors that I find worth commenting on in this article, given some observations I have made in our courts, are: the likelihood of interference with investigations or witnesses, and the likelihood of committing further offences whilst on bail.
- The Problem of “Likelihood” in Bail Rulings
In many contemporary bail hearings, these two “likelihood” factors have become common grounds for refusal. From my observations as a practitioner, particularly in the lower courts, it is increasingly common for the prosecution to allege that an accused person is “likely to interfere with investigations” or “likely to commit further offences” without providing any concrete or credible evidence in support of such assertions. Regrettably, some courts have accepted these claims without insisting on substantiation, resulting in refusals of bail grounded more in speculation than in proof.
This approach runs counter to the constitutional presumption of innocence and to the reasoning in the seminal decision of Okoe v The Republic, where Justice Taylor cautioned against the speculative and punitive deployment of the bail jurisdiction. The authority of Okoe has been affirmed in subsequent decisions, notably in Martin Kpebu v The Republic (No 2), underscoring its enduring relevance in Ghanaian bail jurisprudence.
- The Likelihood of Interfering with Investigations
Section 96(5)(b) allows a court to refuse bail if satisfied that the accused “may interfere with any witness or evidence, or in any way hamper police investigations.” The provision is intended to protect the integrity of the investigative process. However, its broad wording has sometimes been used as a general reason to oppose bail, even where investigations are largely complete or where no evidence supports the allegation.
In Okoe v The Republic, Justice Taylor criticised this ground as suffering from the same defect as the likelihood of further offences. He held that claims of “likelihood” must be supported by cogent and compelling evidence, not mere allegations. His Lordship stated:
‘Evidence tending to establish the future, not the present or past conduct of a person, must of necessity be so cogent and compelling as to leave no room for doubt. Mere allegations without proof as we have been subjected to in our courts in the past would not do.’
Where the prosecution fails to identify any ongoing investigations, potential witnesses, or specific acts of interference that could justify detention, it would not be proper for bail to be refused on this ground. Guided by the precedent in focus, the prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating, through credible and concrete facts, that the accused’s release would realistically jeopardise investigations. For example, if an accused charged with fraud is denied bail on the ground of likely interference, yet the docket is already with the Attorney-General for advice and all statements have been taken, the refusal would be unjustified unless the prosecution can show specific attempts to contact witnesses, tamper with documents, or obstruct enquiries. Justice Taylor further cautioned courts to resist undue pressure from the police and to require concrete evidence before accepting such claims.
- The Likelihood of Committing Further Offences
Section 96(5)(c) requires a court to refuse bail if satisfied that the accused “may commit a further offence when on bail.” Although intended to protect the public, this ground has often been invoked speculatively and without evidence.
In Okoe v The Republic, the prosecution opposed bail partly on the basis that the accused was “likely to commit further offences,” citing a previous conviction and general concerns about land-related violence. Justice Taylor rejected these arguments as “misconceived,” noting the absence of specific facts showing an immediate risk of further violence. He observed that there was no evidence of ongoing threats to the disputed land or any indication that the accused would confront trespassers violently. His Lordship, endorsing the reasoning of Jackson J in Williamson v United States 184 F 2d 280 (2d Cir 1950), that it would be unconscionable to jail persons for “anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes,” held that speculative fears of future offending cannot justify pre-trial detention.
The decision establishes that “likelihood” under this provision must be grounded in concrete, current facts indicating a genuine probability of reoffending — not past conduct, public sentiment, or prosecutorial apprehension.
- The Judicial Duty to Address Contested Likelihoods
When these “likelihood” factors are raised and contested in bail proceedings, the court is, in my view, under a duty to address them directly, explicitly, and with reasons in its ruling. Bail is a discretionary judicial power, but discretion must be exercised judicially and judiciously, and not arbitrarily. Where the prosecution alleges that an accused person is likely to interfere with investigations or commit further offences, and the defence contests those assertions, a failure by the court to evaluate and pronounce upon those issues renders the decision unreasoned and vulnerable to appellate intervention. A ruling that merely recites the statutory grounds without analysing whether the evidential threshold has been met falls short of the standards of reasoned adjudication required in a constitutional democracy.
Justice Taylor adopted a model approach by carefully examining each alleged ground for refusing bail and rejecting those that were unsupported by evidence. His Lordship did not treat the statutory grounds as automatic or self-executing. Rather, he insisted that the court must be satisfied, on the basis of cogent material, that the alleged risks were real and not speculative. This methodical engagement with the bail factors exemplifies the proper judicial approach and underscores the obligation of courts to justify any curtailment of personal liberty with clear and rational reasons.
Okoe v The Republic remains a landmark and enduring authority on the philosophy of bail. Justice Taylor’s reasoning transcends the facts of the case and articulates a principled framework for bail jurisprudence in Ghana. He warned against the use of bail refusal as a covert punitive measure, emphasising that pre-trial detention must not be used to punish or stigmatise an accused person. This warning resonates with section 96(4) of the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30), which expressly prohibits the withholding of bail merely as a form of punishment. Bail, as Justice Taylor underscored, serves a limited procedural function: to secure the attendance of the accused and the proper administration of justice, not to prevent crime or to impose pre-trial sanctions.
- Conclusion
The grant or refusal of bail is a judicial discretion that must be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily. The factors under section 96 are not intended to support refusals based on unsubstantiated fears. The “likelihood” of interference or reoffending must be supported by evidence, not speculation. As Justice Taylor affirmed, endorsing Jackson J’s warning in Williamson v United States, courts must not incarcerate citizens for “anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes.” His reasoning continues to serve as a vital reminder that bail protects liberty, and the judiciary must safeguard this principle against unsubstantiated claims in contemporary bail applications.
References
Cases
Martin Kpebu v The Republic (No 2) [2016] DLSC 11086, accessible at <www.dennislawgh.com>
Okoe v The Republic [1976] 1 GLR 80 (HC)
R v Rose [1895–1899] All ER Rep 350 (CCR)
R v Scaife (1841) 5 JP 406
Williamson v United States 184 F 2d 280 (2d Cir 1950)
Legislation
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, arts 14(4), 19(2)(c)
Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act 1960 (Act 30), s 96 (as amended by NRCD 309)
By Fred Seth Thomas Mireku Jnr,
Kusi-Appiah and Associates
